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INTRODUCTION
The minimum wage is a popular, if controversial, tool of 
economic policy making and for regulating the labour 
markets.2 On the one hand, it is seen as delivering a 
number of positive effects: it prevents the exploitation 
of marginal and vulnerable workers, reduces poverty 
and inequality, raises the standard of living of poor-
ly-paid workers, and increases the labour supply. How-
ever, the minimum wage also has the potential to hurt 
those that it was intended to protect by increasing the 
cost of labour, reducing demand for labour, and even 
making the least productive workers unemployable. 
With ever progressing globalisation and digitalisation 
of production, poorly-paid workers’ jobs can often be 
easily offshored or replaced by a clever machine or an 
app. 
The UK introduced a national minimum wage 
in April 1999. After its introduction, its employment 
effects were analysed by a number of studies. Stewart 
(2004) and Dickens and Draca (2005) consider the effect 
of the minimum wage introduction and the annual 
increases, respectively. Dolton, Rosazza-Bondibene 
and Wadsworth (2009) draw on the fact that, unlike 
the minimum wage rates, average earnings vary con-
siderably across the regions of the UK. They use the 
resulting variation in the ‘bite’ of the minimum wage at 
the regional level to assess its impact on employment. 
These studies find little evidence that the UK minimum 
wage has had an adverse effect on employment. The 
main (and probably only) exception so far is Dickens, 
Riley and Wilkinson (2015) who present evidence that 
the introduction, and annual minimum wage increases, 
reduce the employment of part-time women, a seg-
ment of the labour market that is especially exposed to 
the minimum wage. 
To gauge the effects of a policy, one should look at 
those who are most likely to be affected by it. In the UK, 
as in many other developed countries, the incidence of 
the minimum wage is much higher among young and 
1 This article reports on the results of our previous research, “UK National 
Minimum Wage and Labor Market Outcomes of Young Workers” by Jan Fid-
rmuc and J.D. Tena, published in Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assess-
ment E-Journal 12 (2018-5), and “Minimum Wage and Employment: Escaping 
the Parametric Straitjacket” by Stefano Cabras, Jan Fidrmuc and J.D. Tena, 
published in Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 11 
(2017–15). The underlying research was funded by a grant from the UK Low 
Pay Commission (LPC). 
2  The vast majority of OECD countries impose some form of a minimum 
wage, either determined centrally by the government (whether national or 
local), or through collective bargaining between employers and unions, with 
the outcome being binding also for non-unionized firms (see Dolado et al. 
1996, and Dolton and Rosazza-Bondibene 2012).
part-time workers. The young are also more likely to be 
employed part-time.3 Since its introduction in 1999, UK 
minimum wage regulation has mandated lower rates 
for young workers: at present, different minimum-wage 
rates apply to workers aged 25 and above, 21–24, 18-20, 
and below 18.4 This helps to ensure that young workers, 
who tend to be less productive than older and more 
experienced workers, are not disadvantaged in the 
labour market. However, it also implies that the cost of 
employing young workers at the minimum wage jumps 
by a discrete increment when they reach the threshold 
age. In particular, upon turning 22 (21 from 2010 
onwards), young workers on minimum wage become 
eligible to a pay increase of 20–25%. This is a much 
larger increase than any of the annual minimum-wage 
increases. Moreover, employers can easily replace such 
workers with slightly younger, and cheaper, workers 
who are still below the relevant age threshold. So if we 
want to understand how increases in the minimum 
wage affect employment, it is instructive to look at 
young workers, a segment of the labour market where 
the incidence of the minimum wage is high and where 
workers are subject to relatively large minimum-wage 
increases. 
EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF AGE RELATED 
MINIMUM WAGE INCREASES
In our research, we consider UK young workers aged 
between 18 and the age that makes them eligible for 
the adult rate of the national minimum wage. Such 
workers are considered adults in the UK: they can drive 
(if they have a driver’s license), handle and sell age-re-
stricted goods such as tobacco and alcohol, and work 
late or long hours. As such, they can be considered sub-
stitutes for slightly older workers, except that the latter 
may be slightly more experienced. Therefore, individu-
als just below and just above the age threshold should, 
arguably, be essentially perfect substitutes in terms of 
their productivity and experience – yet they are subject 
to different minimum-wage rates. 
Our main analysis uses the regression discontinu-
ity design (RDD). This quasi-experimental method is 
based on comparing observations on either side of a 
discontinuity: in our case the age threshold for the 
adult minimum-wage rate. If observations on either 
side of the discontinuity differ only with respect to the 
forcing variable (age), but are otherwise similar, the dif-
ferences between them are as good as random. Impor-
tantly, the discontinuity effect can be manifested either 
in a level change (a step increase or decrease in employ-
ment probability), or in a kink in the underlying func-
tional relationship (a slope change in the relationship 
3  See Section 9 and Figures 8a and 8b in Syed et al. (2016).
4  In 1999, when the UK National Minimum Wage was introduced, it featured 
two rates: an adult rate for those aged 22 and above, and a development rate 
for those between 18 and 21. A third rate, for workers aged 16-17, was intro-
duced in 2004. The age threshold for the adult rate was lowered to 21 in 2010. 
Finally, a National Living Wage, applying to anyone aged 25 and above, was 
implemented in 2016. 
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ble for the adult minimum-wage rate, for either males 
or females. However, we find a significantly negative 
effect one year earlier, for male workers turning 21. The 
effect of turning 23, one year after the relevant thresh-
old, is again insignificant for both genders. 
Finding a negative effect at the age of 21, one year 
before the higher minimum-wage rate has to be applied, 
could be explained as an anticipation effect, whereby 
employers either avoid hiring or dismiss, workers who 
are within one year of the age threshold. An alternative 
explanation, however, is that it is driven by the produc-
tivity difference between workers aged 21 and 22. To 
test the latter explanation, we turn to data that pre-
date the minimum-wage introduction in the UK. Table 
2 reports the estimates for the period 1994-99, which 
are all insignificant. Hence, the negative employment 
effect for males aged 21 only occurs in the period when 
the minimum-wage regulation was in effect. 
CONCLUSIONS
The results of our analysis suggest that young work-
ers face a lower probability of employment as they are 
approaching the threshold age at which they become 
eligible for the higher adult rate of the minimum wage. 
The effect, however, does not occur at the age when 
they become eligible for the higher rate. Instead, it takes 
place one year earlier, in a manner that is consistent 
with employers acting in anticipation of the age-related 
minimum wage increase. This reflects the nature of the 
issue at hand: age-related minimum-wage increases 
take place at predetermined ages in a deterministic, 
rather than a random fashion. Therefore, employers 
can act well in advance of the minimum-wage increase. 
Another possibility is that workers approaching 22, 
knowing that soon they will be eligible for a higher 
minimum-wage rate, increase their reservation wage 
before reaching the threshold wage. 
These results have two important implications: 
one policy-related, and the other methodological. The 
policy-related lesson is that well-meant policy meas-
ures, such as implementing a lower minimum-wage 
rate for young workers, can have unexpected adverse 
effects by inducing employers to discriminate against 
workers who are no longer eligible for the reduced rate. 
This incentive is particularly compelling if the pay dif-
ference is relatively large, as in the UK case (20-25%).7 
The methodological lesson, in turn, is that when 
considering age-related discontinuities (and other 
deterministic rather than random allocation mecha-
nisms), the effect need not take place at the threshold 
age. Since the age at which the discontinuity occurs is 
predetermined, it is possible to see anticipation effects, 
such as the one we observe for the minimum wage 
effect. 
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between employment and age).5 We thus estimate the 
following relation: 
 
(1)
where yi is equal to one if the individual is employed (or, 
alternatively, unemployed or inactive), F is the stand-
ard normal cumulative distribution function, agei is age 
in months minus the threshold age (so that the thresh-
old age equals 0), d is a dummy variable equal to one 
when the individual is at the threshold age or older and 
zero otherwise, and Ѳ includes any remaining covari-
ates. We allow for the effect of age to be different before 
and after the young workers attain the threshold age. It 
is worth noting that F is a non-linear function (probit). 
The discontinuity effect on employment thus becomes: 
(2)
It is also worth noting that the effect of discontinuity on 
employment probability depends not only on the coef-
ficient of the discontinuity dummy, β, but also on the 
changes in the slope coefficients of age: α0, α1, α0*, 
and α1*.
The analysis is carried out with the UK Labour 
Force Survey (LFS), a quarterly nationally-representa-
tive survey of UK households of approximately 60,000 
households and over 100,000 individuals aged 16 and 
above in each quarterly survey. The survey contains 
detailed demographic and socio-economic informa-
tion on the respondents, including their labour-market 
outcomes, and the exact date of birth of every respond-
ent.6 The date of birth, together with the information 
on when the survey was carried out, allows us to deter-
5  See Card et al. (2012), Dong (2014), and Nielsen et al. (2010) for further details. 
6  This information is not available in the publicly released LFS datasets. We 
are grateful to the Low Pay Commission and the Office for National Statistics for 
helping us obtain access to the restricted release of the LFS. 
mine the exact age of each respondent at the time of 
the survey. Therefore, we can distinguish the young 
workers on either side of the age threshold. This thresh-
old was 22 years until October 2010, when it was low-
ered to 21. To avoid potentially contaminating our 
results by considering two different age thresholds, we 
only use data from the 2nd quarter (April-June) of 1999 
until the last quarter (October-December) of 2009. Our 
analysis uses all workers whose ages lie within ±15 
months around the age threshold: the threshold age is 
thus 264 months and we consider workers aged 
between 249 and 279 months. 
An important assumption behind the RDD 
approach is that the discontinuity is applied in a 
manner that is as good as random. Examples include 
points thresholds for awarding scholarships, externally 
imposed border changes, or the difference in a compe-
tition between the winner and the runner-up. In the 
case of minimum-wage rates, however, the threshold 
age is known beforehand by both employees (actual 
or potential) and employers. Both can already act in 
advance of the workers reaching the threshold age. 
For instance, if an employer has an incentive to avoid 
employing a 22-years-old worker, they may similarly 
wish to avoid employing one aged 21 and half or 21. 
Likewise, a worker whose reservation wage is below 
the 18-21 minimum-wage rate may nevertheless take 
up employment when aged 20 or 21 in anticipation of 
the statutorily mandated pay increase when turning 22. 
Another possibility is that either employer or employee 
takes action only with a delay, well after reaching the 
threshold age. Therefore, besides looking at the thresh-
old effect at 22 years of age, we also consider 21 and 
23 years. 
The results are summarised in Table 1. It is worth 
noting that we report both the full discontinuity effect 
as given by equation (2) above, and the level effect, 
given by the coefficient estimate of β. We find no dis-
continuity effect on the employment probability when 
turning 22, the age when young workers become eligi-
Table 1
Discontinuity Effect on Employment at 21, 22 and 23 years, 1999–2009
21 years 22 years 23 years 
Males  Females Males Females Males Females 
Discontinuity (1) -.00994 (.00326)** 
-.001039 
(.00349)
-.00228 
(.00331) 
.00368 
(.00353) 
.00435 
(.00318) 
-.00179 
(.00336) 
β (2) -.00764 (.01150) 
-.00186 
(.01184) 
.00567 
(.01097) 
.00589 
(.01154) 
.01043 
(.01023) 
-.01325
(.01138) 
No. observations 68,324 70,647 66,582 70,009 65,206 70,622 
 χ2 17001.14 12155.02 15412.56 12942.46 13443.49 14310.83 
Pr>χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.1947 0.11285 0.1918 0.1411 0.1879 0.1602 
Note: All estimations include covariates. (1) estimated discontinuity effect taking into account the combined impact of age (slope effect) and the threshold dummy 
variable (level effect). (2) estimated impact of the threshold dummy variable only. Coefficients reported are marginal effects at mean values, with standard deviations 
in parentheses. Significance levels denoted as * 5% and ** 1%. 
Source: Labour Force Survey (1999–2009).
Table 2
Discontinuity Effect on Employment at 21, 22 and 23 years in the Pre-NMW period, 1994–98
21 years 22 years 23 years 
Males  Females Males Females Males Females 
Discontinuity (1) -0.004 (0.0181)
-0.0056
(0.0183)
0.00528 
(0.017) 
0.0175 
(0.018)
0.0144 
(0.0156) 
0.0072 
(0.005)
β (2) 0.00804 (0.0055)
-0.0097 
(0.0053)
-0.0008 
(0.005) 
0.00205
(0.0053)
-0.0047 
(0.0045) 
-0.0036
(0.0166)
No. observations 29,872 30,550 30,606 32,265 31,839 34,538
 χ2 7964.52 5768.08 7556.75 6809.31 6873.88 7512.05
Pr>χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R2 0.2052 0.1396 0.1994 0.1592 0.1877 0.1698
Note: All estimations include covariates. (1) estimated discontinuity effect taking into account the combined impact of age (slope effect) and the threshold 
dummy variable (level effect). (2) estimated impact of the threshold dummy variable only. Coefficients reported are marginal effects at mean values, with stan-
dard deviations in parentheses. Significance levels denoted as * 5% and ** 1%. 
Source: Labour Force Survey (1999–2009).
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